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Based on the observation that many existing discrete choice models admit a welfare function of utilities
whose gradient gives the choice probability vector, we propose a new representation of discrete choice model
which we call the welfare-based choice model. The welfare-based choice model is meaningful on its own by
providing a new way of constructing choice models. More importantly, it provides great analysis convenience
for establishing connections among existing choice models. We prove by using convex analysis theory, that the
welfare-based choice model is equivalent to the representative agent choice model and the semi-parametric
choice model, establishing the equivalence of the latter two. We show that these three models are all strictly
more general than the random utility model, while when there are only two alternatives, those four models
are equivalent. In particular, we show that the distinction between the welfare-based choice model and the
random utility model lies in the requirement of the higher-order derivatives of the welfare function. We then
define a new concept in choice models: substitutability/complementarity between alternatives. We show that
the random utility model only allows substitutability between different alternatives; while the welfare-based
choice model allows flexible substitutability/complementarity patterns. We argue that such flexibility could
be desirable in capturing certain practical choice patterns and expanding the scope of discrete choice models.
Examples are given of new choice models proposed under our framework.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study the discrete choice models. Discrete choice models are used to model choices
made by people among a finite set of alternatives. For example, they are used to examine which
product to purchase for a consumer, which mode of transportation to take for a passenger, among
many other choice scenarios people face everyday. In the past few decades, discrete choice models
have attracted great interest in the economics, marketing, operations research and management sci-
ence communities. Specifically, such models have been viewed as the behavioral foundation in many
1
2operational decision-making problems, such as transportation planning, assortment optimization,
multiproduct pricing, etc.
In the past few decades, researchers have proposed a variety of discrete choice models (see
Anderson et al. 1992 and Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). Among them, the most popular one is
the random utility model, in which a utility is assigned to each alternative. In the random utility
model, the utility is composed of a deterministic part and a random part. Each individual then
chooses the alternative with the highest utility, given the realization of the random part. Different
choice models arise when different distributions for the random part are used. Some examples
of random utility model can be found in McFadden (1974, 1980) and Daganzo (1980). Another
popular choice model is the representative agent model, in which a representative agent makes
the choice on behalf of the population. In the representative agent model, there is again a utility
associated with each alternative, and the representative agent maximizes a weighted utility of the
choice (which is a vector of proportions for each alternative) plus a regularization term, which
typically encourages diversification of the choice (Anderson et al. 1988). More recently, a class
of semi-parametric models has been proposed (see Natarajan et al. 2009). This model is similar
to the random utility model. However, instead of specifying a single distribution for the random
utility, a set of distributions is considered. Then they choose one extreme distribution in that set to
determine the choice probabilities. There are other choice models based on the dynamics of choice
decisions or other non-parametric ideas. We will provide a more detailed review of these models in
Section 2.
Although these models have all provided excellent explanations, both theoretically and empir-
ically, for how people make choices in practice, some gaps in the literature still exist regarding
the relations between those popular choice models. In particular, the following questions are not
answered in the prior literature:
1. What is the relation between the representative agent model and the semi-parametric model?
It has been shown that for many special cases, the semi-parametric model can be represented
as a representative agent model. However, it is unknown whether this is generally true.
2. It is known that both the representative agent model and the semi-parametric model are more
general than the random utility model. What exactly is the distinction between these models?
3. What choice pattern is restricted in the random utility model? Can we easily construct choice
models that relax those restrictions?
In this paper, we present precise answers to the above questions. To answer those questions, we
propose a new class of choice models, which we call the welfare-based choice model. The welfare-
based choice model is based on the observation that many existing choice models take the form of
3mapping a utility vector to a probability vector and admit a welfare function of the utilities whose
gradient gives the choice probability vector. Therefore, by directly proposing desirable conditions
on the welfare functions, we define the class of welfare-based choice models. We show that the
welfare-based choice model is not only meaningful on its own, but also provides great analysis
convenience for establishing connections between existing choice models.
First, we show that by using the welfare-based choice model as an intermediate model, the classes
of choice models defined by: 1) the welfare-based choice model, 2) the representative agent model
and 3) the semi-parametric model, are the same. More precisely, under mild regularity assumptions,
given any of the following three: a choice welfare function (which defines a welfare-based choice
model), a regularization function (which defines a representative agent model) or a distribution
set (which defines a semi-parametric model), one can construct the other two to define exactly
the same choice model. This means that the class of representative agent models and the class of
semi-parametric models are equivalent to each other, which is somewhat surprising because they
seem to have very different origins. In addition, our proof of the equivalence of these three models
is constructive, therefore, it gives methods to convert one model to another in an explicit way,
potentially alleviating the need to construct correspondences in a case by case manner as is done
in the current research.
Second, we study the relation between the above three models and the random utility model.
We show that when there are only two alternatives, the random utility model is equivalent to the
above three models. We also demonstrate that this is not true in general if there are more than two
alternatives, in which case the above three models strictly subsume the random utility model. In
particular, we point out the exact distinction between these three models and the random utility
model, which lies in the higher-order derivatives of the choice function. Our result gives precise
relations among those models.
Finally, by examining the difference between the welfare-based choice model and the random
utility model, we identify an important property that is restricted in the random utility model
but is flexible in the other three models. We call the property substitutability and complementar-
ity of alternatives. Specifically, this property examines whether the choice probability of another
alternative will increase or decrease when the utility of one alternative increases. We show that
random utility models only allow substitutability between alternatives. Although this is natural
in many practical situations, we argue that in certain applications, it might be appealing to allow
some alternatives to exhibit complementarity in certain range, especially when the utility is based
on scores and certain alternatives share the same feature (e.g., brand or certain component) on
4which the score is based. We derive conditions under which different choice models exhibit substi-
tutable/complementary properties. As far as we know, we are the first to study such properties in
choice models, and we believe that this study will open new possibilities in the design of choice
models by enlarging its horizon and capturing more practical choice patterns. In fact, we show a
few examples of new choice models that allow complementarity among choices (in a certain range)
and explain the practicality of those models.
It is worth mentioning that the analysis technique used in this paper is novel and interesting.
In particular, we adopt several convex analysis tools that are not commonly used in the study
of choice models. Such tools enable us to uncover deep connections between seemingly unrelated
models and are key to our findings. We believe that such analysis methods may be of independent
interest in the future study of choice models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review discrete choice
models that are relevant to our study. In Section 3, we propose the welfare-based choice model
and study its relation with other choice models. In Section 4, we study the relation between the
welfare-based choice model and the random utility model. In Section 5, we propose the concept
of substitutability and complementarity between choice alternatives and derive conditions under
which each model exhibits such properties. We discuss the issue of constructing new choice models
from existing ones in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
Notations. Throughout the paper, the following notations will be used. We use notation R
to denote the set of real numbers, and R¯ = R ∪ {−∞,+∞} to denote the set of extended real
numbers. We use e to denote a vector of all ones, ei to denote a vector of zeros except 1 at the
ith entry, and 0 to denote a vector of all zeros (the dimension of these vectors will be clear from
the context). Also, we write x≥ y to denote a componentwise relationship and ∆n−1 to denote the
n− 1-dimensional simplex, i.e., ∆n−1 = {x|e
Tx= 1,x≥ 0}. In our discussions, ordinary lowercase
letters x, y, . . . denote scalars, boldfaced lowercase letters x,y, . . . denote vectors.
2. Review of Existing Discrete Choice Models
In this section, we review several prevailing classes of discrete choice models that are related to the
discussion in this paper.
2.1. Random Utility Model
Perhaps the most popular class of discrete choice model is the random utility model (RUM),
proposed first by Thurstone (1927) and later studied in a vast literature in economics (see
Anderson et al. 1992 for a comprehensive review). In such a model, a random utility is assigned to
5each of the alternatives, and an individual will pick the alternative with the highest realized utility.
Here, the randomness could be due to the lack of information of the alternatives for a particular
individual or to the idiosyncrasies of preferences among a population. As the output, the random
utility model predicts a vector of choice probabilities among the alternatives, rather than a single
deterministic choice. Mathematically, suppose there are n alternatives denoted by N = {1,2, ..., n},
then the random utility model assumes that the utility of alternative i takes the following form:
ui = µi+ ǫi, ∀i∈N , (1)
where µ= (µ1, ..., µn) is the deterministic part of the utility and ǫ= (ǫ1, ..., ǫn) is the random part.
In the random utility model, it is assumed that the joint distribution θ of ǫ= (ǫ1, ..., ǫn) is known.
Then the probability that alternative i will be chosen is (to ensure the following equation is well-
defined, we assume θ is absolutely continuous, an assumption we make for all the random utility
models we discuss later):
qi(µ) = Pǫ∼θ
(
i=argmax
k∈N
(µk+ ǫk)
)
. (2)
Random utility models can be further classified by the distribution function of the random
components. The most widely used one is the multinomial logit (MNL) model, first proposed by
McFadden (1974). The MNL model is derived by assuming that (ǫ1, ..., ǫn) follow independent and
identically distributed Gumbel distributions with scale parameter η. Given that assumption, the
choice probability in (2) can be further written as follows:
qmnli (µ) =
exp(µi/η)∑
k∈N
exp(µk/η)
.
It can also be computed that the expected utility an individual can get under the MNL model is:
wmnl(µ) =Eǫ∼θ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]
= η log
(∑
i∈N
exp(µi/η)
)
.
The existence of closed-form formulae for the MNL model makes it a very popular choice model.
We refer the readers to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) Anderson et al. (1992) and Train (2009) for
more discussions on the properties of the MNL model. In addition to the MNL model, there are
other choices of the random part in (1) that lead to alternative choice models. Some popular ones
among them are the probit model (in which ǫ is chosen to be a joint normal distribution, see, e.g.,
Daganzo 1980), the nested logit model (in which ǫ is chosen to be correlated general extreme value
distributions, see, e.g., McFadden 1980), the mixed logit model (where ǫ is chosen to be Gumbel
distributions with a correlated term, see, e.g., McFadden and Train 2000, and Train 2009) and
the exponomial choice model (in which ǫ is chosen to be negative exponential distributions, see
Alptekinoglu and Temple 2013).
62.2. Representative Agent Model
Another popular way to model choice is to use a representative agent model (RAM). In such a
model, a representative agent makes a choice among n alternatives on behalf of the entire popula-
tion. In particular, this agent may choose any fractional amount of each alternative, or equivalently,
his choice is a vector x= (x1, ..., xn) on ∆n−1. To make his choice, the agent takes into account the
expected utility while preferring some degree of diversification. More precisely, the representative
agent solves an optimization problem as follows:
maximizex∈∆n−1 µ
Tx−V (x). (3)
Here µ= (µ1, ..., µn) is the deterministic utility of each alternative, which is similar to that in the
random utility model. V (x) :Rn 7→ R is a regularization term that rewards diversification. Later,
we denote the optimal value of (3) by wr(µ), which is the utility a representative agent can obtain
if the deterministic utility vector is µ. Moreover, if for any µ, there is a unique solution to (3),
then we define
qr(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} (4)
to be the choice probability vector given by the representative agent model. (To ensure the maxi-
mum is attainable, V (x) is required to be lower semi-continuous. We make this assumption for all
the representative agent models in our discussions.)
A recognized close connection exists between the random utility model and the representative
agent model. In Anderson et al. (1988), the authors show that the choice probabilities from an
MNL model with parameter η can be equally derived from a representative agent model with
V (x) = η
∑n
i=1 xi logxi. Or equivalently, we can write
qmnl(µ) = argmax
{
µTx− η
n∑
i=1
xi logxi
∣∣∣ x∈∆n−1
}
.
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) further extend the result to general random utility models. They
show that for any random utility model with continuously distributed random utility, there exists
a representative agent model that gives the same choice probability. The precise statement of their
result is as follows:
Proposition 1. Let q(µ) :Rn 7→∆n−1 be the choice probability function defined in (2) where
the random vector ǫ admits a strictly positive density on Rn and the function q(µ) is continuously
differentiable. Then there exists V (·) such that:
q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣∣ x∈∆n−1} .
7They also show that the reverse statement of Proposition 1 is not true:
Proposition 2 (Proposition 2.2 in Hofbauer and Sandholm 2002). When n ≥ 4, there
does not exist a random utility model that is equivalent to the representative agent model with
V (x) =−
∑n
i=1 logxi.
Based on the above two propositions, we know that the representative agent model strictly
subsumes the random utility model as a special case.
2.3. Semi-Parametric Choice Model
Recently, a new class of semi-parametric choice model (SCM) was proposed by Natarajan et al.
(2009). Unlike the random utility model where a certain distribution of the random utility ǫ is
specified, in the semi-parametric choice model, one considers a set of distributions Θ for ǫ. Given
the deterministic utility vector µ, one defines the maximum expected utility function ws(µ) as
follows:
ws(µ) = sup
θ∈Θ
Eǫ∼θ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]
. (5)
Note that in the random utility model, the maximum expected utility function can be defined in a
similar way, but only with a single distribution θ. Thus the semi-parametric choice model can be
viewed as an extension of the random utility model. Let θ∗(µ) denote the extreme distribution (or a
limit of a sequence of distributions) that attains the optimal solution in (5). The choice probability
for alternative i under this model is given by (provided it is well-defined):
qsi (µ) = Pθ∗(µ)
(
i=argmax
k∈N
(µk+ ǫk)
)
. (6)
Several special cases of semi-parametric choice models have been studied recently. One such
model, called the marginal distribution model (MDM), is proposed by Natarajan et al. (2009).
In the MDM, the distribution set Θ contains all the distributions that have certain marginal
distributions. The following proposition proved in Natarajan et al. (2009) shows that the marginal
distribution model can be equivalently represented by a representative agent model:
Proposition 3. Suppose Θ= {θ|ǫi ∼ Fi(·),∀i} where Fi(·)s are given continuous distributions.
Then we have:
ws(µ) =max
x
{
µTx+
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
1−xi
F−1i (t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣x∈∆n−1
}
. (7)
Furthermore, the choice probabilities qs(µ) can be obtained as the optimal solution x∗ in (7).
8Another semi-parametric model is the marginal moment model (MMM), in which only the first
and second moments of the marginal distributions are known and Θ comprises all distributions
that are consistent with the marginal moments. Natarajan et al. (2009) show that the MMM can
also be represented as a representative agent model (without loss of generality, we assume that the
marginal mean of ǫi is 0 for all i):
Proposition 4. Suppose the marginal variance of ǫi is σi for all i. Then we have
ws(µ) =max
x
{
µTx+
n∑
i=1
σi
√
xi(1−xi)
∣∣∣∣∣x∈∆n−1
}
. (8)
Furthermore, the choice probabilities qs(µ) can be obtained as the optimal solution x∗ in (8).
In order to incorporate covariance information, Mishra et al. (2012) further propose a complete
moment model (CMM), in which Θ is the set of distributions with known first and second moments
Σ (covariance matrix). It is shown in Ahipasaoglu et al. (2013) that the CMM model can also
be written as a representative agent model (again without loss of generality, we assume the first
moments are 0):
Proposition 5. Assume Σ≻ 0. Then we have:
ws(µ) =max
x
{
µTx+ trace
(
Σ1/2S(x)Σ1/2
)1/2∣∣∣∣x∈∆n−1
}
, (9)
where S(x) =Diag(x)−xxT and trace(X) is the trace of the matrix X. Furthermore, the choice
probabilities qs(µ) can be obtained as the optimal solution x∗ in (9).
Thus, all semi-parametric models studied so far can be represented as representative agent
models. In the next section, we will show that this is generally the case. Moreover, we show that
in fact, the set of representative agent models is equivalent to that of semi-parametric models.
Before we end this section, we comment that there are other types of choice models in the
literature in addition to those mentioned above, such as the Markov chain-based choice model
(see Blanchet et al. 2013), the two-stage choice model (see Jagabathula and Rusmevichientong
2013), the generalized attraction model (see Gallego et al. 2014) and the non-parametric model
(see Farias et al. 2013). However, they are based on different ideas and are less related to our study.
Therefore, we choose not to include a detailed review of those models in this paper.
93. Welfare-Based Choice Model
In this section, we propose a new framework for discrete choice models and show that it provides
a way to unify the various choice models reviewed in Section 2. To introduce our new model, we
first notice that although various choice models reviewed in Section 2 are based on different ideas,
they are all essentially functions from a vector of utilities µ to a vector of choice probabilities q(µ).
Moreover, each of these models allows a welfare function w(µ) that captures the expected utility
that an individual can get from the choice model, and the choice probability vector can be viewed
as the gradient of w(µ) with respect to µ. Our proposed model is based on these observations. In
particular, we first construct a class of welfare functions by defining what properties such functions
should satisfy. Then we discuss the relation between our model and the previous ones. We start by
making the following definition:
Definition 1 (Choice Welfare Function). Let w(µ) be a mapping from Rn to R¯. We call
w(µ) a choice welfare function if w(µ) satisfies the following properties:
1. (Monotonicity): For any µ1, µ2 ∈R
n and µ1 ≥µ2, w(µ1)≥w(µ2);
2. (Translation Invariance): For any µ∈Rn, t∈R, w(µ+ te) =w(µ)+ t;
3. (Convexity): For any µ1, µ2 ∈R
n and 0≤ λ≤ 1, λw(µ1)+ (1−λ)w(µ2)≥w(λµ1+(1−λ)µ2).
In addition to the three properties, if w(µ) is also differentiable, then we call w(µ) a differentiable
choice welfare function.
Here we make a few comments on the three conditions in Definition 1. The monotonicity condition
is straightforward. It requires that the welfare is higher if all alternatives have higher deterministic
utilities. The translation invariance property requires that if the deterministic utilities of all alter-
natives increase by a certain amount t, then the choice welfare function will increase by the same
amount. This is reasonable given that choice is about relative preferences, therefore, increasing the
utilities of all alternatives by the same amount will not change the relative preferences but will
only increase the welfare by the amount of the increment. Later, we will see that this condition is
necessary to guarantee well-defined choice probabilities. The last condition of convexity basically
states that the welfare is higher when there is an alternative with high utility rather than several
mediocre alternatives. This is again plausible in reality and as we will see later, all previously
reviewed choice models satisfy this condition.
In the following, we show that a choice welfare function has two equivalent representations:
a convex optimization representation and a semi-parametric representation. This result will be
instrumental for us to derive the relations among choice models.
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:
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1 w(µ) is a choice welfare function;
2 There exists a convex function V (x) : ∆n−1 7→ R¯ such that
w(µ) =max
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} ; (10)
3 There exists a distribution set Θ such that
w(µ) = sup
θ∈Θ
Eǫ∼θ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]
. (11)
Proof. First we show that the w(µ) defined in (10) and (11) are choice welfare functions. To see
this, we note that the monotonicity and translation invariance properties are immediate from (10)
and (11). For the convexity, we note that w(µ) defined in (10) is the supremum of linear functions
of µ thus is convex in µ. In (11), for each ǫ, maxi∈N {µi+ ǫi} is a convex function in µ, and so
is the expectation. Therefore, if w(µ) is defined by (10) or (11), then it must be a choice welfare
function.
Next we show the other direction. That is, if w(µ) is a choice welfare function, then it can be
represented in the form of (10) and (11). First we note that if a choice welfare function w(µ) =∞
for some µ, then by the translation invariance property and the monotonicity property, it must be
that w(µ) =∞ for any µ. In that case, we can choose V (x) =−∞ and Θ = {θ∞} where θ∞ is a
singleton distribution taking value on (∞, ...,∞). Therefore, w(µ) can be represented by (10) and
(11) in that case. Similarly, if w(µ) =−∞ for some µ, then it must be that w(µ) =−∞ for all µ,
and we can take V (x) =∞ and Θ= {θ−∞}, where θ−∞ is a singleton distribution on (−∞, ...,−∞).
Therefore, w(µ) can be represented in (10) and (11) in this case too.
In the remainder of the proof, we focus on the case where w(µ) is finite for all µ. In this case,
by Proposition 1.4.6 of Bertsekas (2003), w(µ) must be continuous. The remaining proof is divided
into two parts:
1. We show that any choice welfare function w(µ) can be represented by (10). Since w(µ) is
monotone and translation invariant, the following holds:
w(µ) =min
y
{
w(y)+max
i
{µi− yi}
}
=min
y
{
w(y)+ max
x∈∆n−1
(µ−y)Tx
}
.
Here the first equality holds since for any y, w(µ) = w(µ − maxi {µi− yi}e) + maxi {µi− yi}
by the translation invariance property. Furthermore, by the monotonicity property, w(µ −
maxi {µi− yi}e)≤w(y) and the equality holds when y=µ.
Next we define L(x,y) = w(y) + (µ − y)Tx. We have for fixed x, L(x, ·) is convex in y
(by the convexity of w(·)); and for fixed y, L(·,y) is convex and closed in x. Furthermore,
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infy maxx∈∆n−1 L(x,y) =w(µ)<∞ and the function p(u) = infy maxx∈∆n−1 {L(x,y)−u
Tx}=
w(µ−u) is continuous. Therefore, by Proposition 2.6.2 of Bertsekas (2003), the minimax equality
holds, i.e.,
inf
y
max
x∈∆n−1
L(x,y) = max
x∈∆n−1
inf
y
L(x,y).
Therefore, we have:
w(µ) = max
x∈∆n−1
{
µTx+ inf
y
{
w(y)−yTx
}}
= max
x∈∆n−1
{µTx−V (x)}
where V (x) = supy{y
Tx−w(y)} is a convex function.
2. Next we show that any choice welfare function can be represented by (11). Since w(µ)
is convex, there exists a subgradient for any µ. We denote the subgradient vector by d(µ) =
(d1(µ), . . . , dn(µ))
T . Here it is possible that the choice of d(µ) is not unique, in that case, we can
choose an arbitrary one. Furthermore, by taking the derivative with respect to t in the translation
invariance equation, and by applying the chain rule (see Proposition 4.2.5 of Bertsekas 2003), we
have for any subgradient d(µ), it must hold that eTd(µ) = 1. Similarly, by the monotonicity prop-
erty of w(µ), we must have d(µ)≥ 0. By the definition of subgradient and the convexity of w(µ),
we must have:
w(µ)≥ (µ− z)Td(z)+w(z), ∀z ∈Rn,
where the equality holds when z =µ. Define l(z) =w(z)−zTd(z). By reorganizing terms, we have
w(µ) = sup
z
{µTd(z)+ l(z)}. (12)
Now we define the distribution set as follows: Let Θ = {θz
∣∣z ∈ Rn}, where θz is an n-point
distribution with
Pθz
(
ǫ= ǫiz
)
= di(z), for i= 1, ..., n
where
ǫiz(j) =
{
l(z) if j = i
−∞ if j 6= i.
That is, ǫiz is a vector of all −∞’s except l(z) at the ith entry. Therefore, for any z, we have
Eθz [maxi
{µi+ ǫi}] =
n∑
i=1
di(z)(µi+ l(z)) =µ
Td(z)+ l(z).
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Then by (12), we have
w(µ) = sup
z
{µTd(z)+ l(z)}= sup
z
Eθz [maxi
{µi+ ǫi}] = sup
θ∈Θ
Eθ[max
i
{µi+ ǫi}].
Therefore, the theorem is proved. 
Note that the above discussion focuses on the equivalent representations of the choice welfare
function. In the following we establish its implication to discrete choice models. In this paper, we
refer to discrete choice models as the entire set of functions q(µ) :Rn 7→∆n−1, mapping a utility
vector to a choice probability vector. We first propose the following choice model based on the
choice welfare function:
Definition 2 (Welfare-based Choice Model). Suppose w(µ) is a differentiable choice
welfare function. Then the welfare-based choice model derived from w(µ) is defined by
q(µ) =∇w(µ). (13)
Note that when w(·) is differentiable, we have ∇w(µ) ∈ ∆n−1 by the translation invariance
property of w(µ). Therefore q(µ) defined by (13) is indeed a valid choice model. Next we show the
equivalence of various choice models. We first introduce the following definitions (see Rockafellar
1974):
Definition 3 (Proper Function). A function f :X 7→ R¯ is proper if f(x)<∞ for at least
one x∈X and f(x)>−∞ for all x∈X.
Definition 4 (Essentially Strictly Convex Function). A proper convex function f on
Rn is essentially strictly convex if f is strictly convex on every convex subset of
dom(∂f) =
{
x
∣∣∂f(x) 6= φ} .
where ∂f(x) is the set of subgradients of f at x, and φ is the empty set.
Note that any strictly convex function is essentially strictly convex. Next we have the following
theorem, whose proof is relegated to the Appendix:
Theorem 2. For a choice model q :Rn 7→∆n−1, the following statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a differentiable choice welfare function w(µ) such that q(µ) =∇w(µ);
2. There exists an essentially strictly convex function V (x) such that
q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣∣x∈∆n−1} ;
3. There exists a distribution set Θ such that
q(µ) =∇µ
{
sup
θ∈Θ
Eθ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]}
.
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The next corollary follows immediately from Theorem 2 and Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. Let q(µ) be a random utility model with absolutely continuous distribution θ and
w(µ) be the corresponding expected utility an individual can get under this model. Then w(µ) is a
differentiable choice welfare function, and q(µ) =∇w(µ). Moreover, the reverse statement is not
true, i.e., there exists a differentiable choice welfare function w(µ) such that there is no random
utility model that gives the choice probability q(µ) =∇w(µ).
The significance of Theorems 1 and 2 is mainly twofold. First, we propose a new framework for
discrete choice model, the welfare-based choice model, which is based on the desired functional
properties of the expected utility function. With the help of the new framework, we establish
the connection between two existing choice models, the representative agent model and the semi-
parametric model. In particular, we show that those two classes of choice models are equivalent.
This result explains the prior results that for every known semi-parametric model, there is a
corresponding representative agent model. In addition, it asserts that the reverse is also true, which
is quite surprising in some sense. Therefore, in terms of the scope of choice models that can be
captured, those three models (the welfare-based choice model, the representative agent model and
the semi-parametric model) are the same. We believe this result is useful for the theoretical study
of discrete choice models.
Second, by establishing the equivalence of the three classes of choice models, we can allow
more versatile ways to construct a choice model. In particular, we can pick any of the three
representations to start with. For the welfare-based choice model, one needs to choose a choice
welfare function w(µ) which satisfies the three conditions. For the representative agent model, one
needs to choose a (strictly) convex regularization function. And for the semi-parametric model,
one needs to choose a set of distributions. In different situations, it might be easier to use one
representation than the other in order to capture certain properties of the choice model. In addition,
by Corollary 1, the welfare-based choice model strictly subsumes the random utility model, thus it
is possible to construct new choice models that have certain interesting properties that a random
utility model could not accommodate. We will further study this issue in Sections 4 and 5.
The next theorem studies one desirable property of choice models and investigates how it can
be reflected to the construction of the three choice models. We start with the following definition:
Definition 5 (superlinear choice welfare function). A differentiable choice welfare
function w(µ) is called superlinear if there exist bi, i= 1, ..., n, such that for any µ ∈R
n:
w(µ)≥ µi+ bi, ∀ i= 1, ..., n.
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This property is desirable in most applications. It requires that the utility one can get from a set
of alternatives is not much less than the utility of each alternative. After all, for each alternative
i, one can always choose it and obtain the corresponding utility. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For a choice model q :Rn 7→∆n−1, the following statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a superlinear differentiable choice welfare function w(µ) such that q(µ) =∇w(µ);
2. There exists an essentially strictly convex function V (x) that is upper bounded on ∆n−1 such
that
q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣∣x∈∆n−1} ;
3. There exists a distribution set Θ containing only distributions with finite expectation (i.e.,
Eθ|ǫi|<∞ for all i and θ ∈Θ) such that
q(µ) =∇µ
{
sup
θ∈Θ
Eθ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]}
,
Moreover, if either of the above cases holds, then q(µ) can span the whole simplex, i.e., for all x
in the interior of ∆n−1, there exists µ such that q(µ) =x.
We present the proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix. We can see that Theorem 3 further devel-
ops the equivalence of choice models obtained in Theorem 2 by narrowing down the discussion to
welfare-based choice models with the desirable superlinear property. In particular, we find that a
superlinear differentiable choice welfare function has a semi-parametric representation, of which
the distribution set contains at least one bounded distribution. The distribution set containing
bounded distribution is also desirable due to its potential practical application. The last statement
that q(µ) spans the whole simplex is related to the results in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002),
Norets and Takahashi (2013) and Mishra et al. (2014). These papers provide conditions under
which q(µ) defined from the RUM or the MDM can span the whole simplex. Theorem 3 extends
these results to more general conditions.
4. Relation to the Random Utility Model
In the last section, we proposed a new framework for choice models: the welfare-based choice model.
In particular, by Corollary 1, the class of welfare-based choice models strictly subsumes the random
utility model. In this section, we investigate further the relation between the welfare-based choice
model and the random utility model. In particular, we study under what conditions a welfare-based
choice model can be equivalently represented by a random utility model. This study will help us
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understand clearly the relations between various choice models and the random utility model and
design new choice models that do not necessarily have a random utility representation.
First, we show that when there are only two alternatives, the class of random utility models is
equivalent to the class of welfare-based choice models.
Theorem 4. For any differentiable choice welfare function w(µ1, µ2), there exists a distribution
θ of {ǫ1, ǫ2} such that:
w(µ1, µ2) =Eθ[max{µ1+ ǫ1, µ2+ ǫ2}]. (14)
In addition, if w(µ1, µ2) is superlinear, then there exists a distribution θ with finite expectation
(i.e., Eθ|ǫ1|<∞ and Eθ|ǫ2|<∞) that satisfies (14).
Proof. Define v(x),w(x,0). Since w(·) is differentiable, by the chain rule, we have
v′(x) =
∂w
∂µ1
(x,0).
Since w(µ1, µ2) is convex and satisfies the translation invariance property, we have v
′(x) ∈ [0,1]
and is increasing. We define a distribution θ of {ǫ1, ǫ2} as follows:
{ǫ1, ǫ2}=
{
v0−max{ξ,0}, v0−max{−ξ,0}
}
,
where v0 = v(0) =w(0,0) and ξ is a random variable with c.d.f. Fξ(x) = P(ξ≤ x) = v
′(x). Note F (·)
is a well-defined c.d.f. since w(·) is convex and differentiable, thus v′(x) must be continuous and
increasing (Rockafellar 1974).
Now we compute Eθ[max{µ1+ ǫ1, µ2+ ǫ2}]. We have
Eθ[max{µ1+ ǫ1, µ2+ ǫ2}] = µ1+ v0+Eθ[max{−max{ξ,0}, µ2−µ1−max{−ξ,0}}]
= µ1+ v0+Eθ[max{0, µ2−µ1+ ξ}−max{ξ,0}],
where the last step can be verified by considering ξ ≥ 0 and ξ ≤ 0, respectively.
Now we compute the last term. For x≥ 0, we have (let I(·) be the indicator function):
Eθ[max{0, x+ ξ}−max{0, ξ}] = xP(ξ > 0)+Eθ[(x+ ξ) · I(−x< ξ ≤ 0)]
= xP(ξ > 0)+
∫ 0
−x
(x+ ξ)dv′(ξ)
= x(1− v′(0))+ (x+ ξ)v′(ξ) |0−x −
∫ 0
−x
v′(ξ)dξ
= x− v0+ v(−x).
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Similarly, for x≤ 0, we have
Eθ[max{0, x+ ξ}−max{0, ξ}] = xP(ξ >−x)+Eθ[−ξ · I(0< ξ ≤−x)]
= xP(ξ >−x)−
∫ −x
0
ξdv′(ξ)
= x(1− v′(−x))− ξv′(ξ) |−x0 +
∫ −x
0
v′(ξ)dξ
= x− v0+ v(−x).
Therefore, Eθ[max{µ1+ ǫ1, µ2+ ǫ2}] = µ1+ v0+(µ2−µ1)− v0+ v(µ1−µ2) =w(µ1, µ2).
To prove the last statement, it suffices to show that both Eθ[max{0, ξ}] and Eθ[max{0,−ξ}] are
finite if w(µ) is superlinear. If w(·) is superlinear, then we have v(t)− t= w(0,−t) is decreasing
in t and lower bounded, thus L1 = limt→+∞(v(t)− t) exists and is finite. Similarly, v(t) =w(t,0) is
increasing in t and lower bounded, thus L2 = limt→−∞ v(t) exists and is finite. Therefore, we have:
Eθ[max{0, ξ}] =
∫ +∞
0
Pθ (ξ ≥ t)dt=
∫ +∞
0
(1− v′(t))dt= (t− v(t))
∣∣+∞
0
= v(0)−L1,
and
Eθ[max{0,−ξ}] =
∫ +∞
0
Pθ (−ξ ≥ t)dt=
∫ +∞
0
v′(−t)dt=
∫ 0
−∞
v′(t)dt= v(0)−L2.
Thus, the theorem is proved. 
By Proposition 2, when n ≥ 4, the welfare-based choice model strictly subsumes the random
utility model. In fact, as we will see in some examples later (Examples 2 and 3 in Section 5), this is
also true for n= 3. In light of this relation between these two classes of choice models, it would be
interesting to know the exact difference between them. In other words, it would be interesting to
know what property is restricted in the random utility model but not in the welfare-based choice
model. In the following, we pinpoint this difference. The following result is a direct consequence of
the result in McFadden (1980):
Proposition 6. Let w(µ) : Rn 7→ R be a differentiable function. Then ∇w(µ) is consistent
with a random utility model if and only if w(·) satisfies the monotonicity, translation invariance,
convexity properties, and for any k ≥ 1 and i1, ..., ik all distinct,
(−1)k
∂kw(µ)
∂µi1 , ..., ∂µik
≤ 0.
By Proposition 6 and the above discussions, we point out that the difference between a random
utility model and a welfare-based choice model (thus also the representative agent model and the
semi-parametric model by Theorem 2) lies in the requirement on the higher-order derivatives of
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w(·). In particular, a random utility model requires that the higher-order cross-partial derivatives
of w(·) have alternating signs, while in the welfare-based choice model, it only requires that the
Hessian matrix of w(·) be positive semidefinite, and there is no requirement on other higher-order
derivatives. This difference will enable us to better understand the difference between those models
and later construct choice models with new properties.
We next consider an important subclass of the random utility model: the generalized extreme
value (GEV) model. The GEV model was first proposed by McFadden et al. (1978). It is a special
case of the random utility model in which the random part of the utility ǫis take a joint generalized
extreme value distribution. The GEV model covers various popular models, including the MNL
model, the nested logit model, etc. An equivalent definition of the GEV model is given as follows
(McFadden 1980):
Definition 6 (GEV model). A choice model q(µ) is a GEV model if and only if there exists
a function H(y) :Rn+ 7→R such that
q(µ) = η∇µlogH(e
µ1 , . . . , eµn), (15)
where H(y) satisfies the following properties:
1. H(y)≥ 0 for all y ∈Rn+.
2. H(y) is homogeneous of degree 1/η, i.e., H(αy) = α1/ηH(y).
3. H(y)→∞ as yj →∞ for any j.
4. The kth-order cross-partial derivatives of H(y) exist for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and for all distinct
i1, ..., ik ,
(−1)k
∂kH(y)
∂yi1 ...∂yik
≤ 0.
Under appropriate specifications of H(·), various known choice models can be obtained from the
GEV model. We list the MNL model and the nested logit model as examples (Train 2009).
• MNL model. If one chooses H(y) =
∑
i∈N y
1/η
i , then the corresponding choice model is the
MNL model with choice probabilities:
qi(µ) =
exp(µi/η)∑
k∈N
exp(µk/η)
.
• Nested Logit model. Suppose the n alternatives are partitioned into K nests labeled B1, ...,BK .
If one chooses H(y) =
∑K
l=1
(∑
i∈Bl
y
1/λl
i
)λl
, then the corresponding choice model is the nested
logit model with choice probabilities:
qi(µ) =
exp(µi/λk)(
∑
j∈Bk
exp(µj/λk))
λk−1
∑K
l=1
(∑
j∈Bl
exp(µj/λl)
)λl .
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Since the welfare-based choice model strictly subsumes the random utility model, we know
that the GEV model can be equivalently represented by welfare-based choice models. By q(µ) =
∇µw(µ) = η∇µ logH(e
µ1, . . . , eµn), it is implied that a GEV model derived from a specific H(·) is
equivalent to a welfare-based choice model with welfare function w(µ) = ηlogH(eµ1, . . . , eµn) and
such w(·) must satisfy the properties in Proposition 6.
Conversely, for any w(µ) being a differentiable choice welfare function, we can define a function
H(y) = exp(w(log y1, . . . , logyn)/η). The following discussions point out what properties such an
H(·) would satisfy:
1. By definition, H(z)≥ 0 for all z.
2. Since w(·) is translation invariant, we have that H(αz) =α1/ηH(z), i.e., H(z) is homogeneous
of degree 1/η.
3. Since w(·) is monotone, we have
∂w(µ)
∂µi
=
η exp(µi)H
(1)
i (z)
H(z)
≥ 0, ∀i∈N .
where z = (eµ1, . . . , eµn) and H
(1)
i (·) is the partial derivative of H with respect to i. Therefore,
all first-order partial derivatives of H(z) are non-negative.
4. Last, in order for w(·) to be convex, we need the Hessian matrix of w(·) defined as follows to
be positive semidefinite:
∂2w(µ)
∂µi∂µj
=
η exp(µi+µj)
(
H(z) ·H(2)ij (z)−H
(1)
i (z) ·H
(1)
j (z)
)
H2(z)
and
∂2w(µ)
∂µ2i
=−
∑
j 6=i
∂2w(µ)
∂µi∂µj
.
where z = (eµ1, . . . , eµn), H
(1)
i is the partial derivative of H(·) with respect to i, and H
(2)
ij is the
second-order partial derivative of H(·) with respect to i and j.
It is worth pointing out that the last condition holds if all second-order cross-partial derivatives
of H are negative, but the reverse is not necessarily true (the equivalent condition involves all
the zero-, first- and second-order derivatives of H). Therefore, the GEV model requires an even
stronger condition that the higher-order derivatives of exp(w(log y1, ..., log yn)/η) have alternating
signs, while in the welfare-based choice model, we only need the first-order derivative to be positive
and some condition that is weaker than requiring all the cross second-order derivatives be negative.
5. Substitutability and Complementarity of Choices
In the previous section, we have seen that the distinction between the welfare-based choice model
and the random utility model lies in the property of the higher-order derivatives of the choice
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welfare function. In particular, the random utility model has stronger requirements on the higher-
order derivatives. In this section, we will discuss more in depth about the practical meaning of such
properties. We introduce two concepts, which we call the substitutability and complementarity of
choices and then discuss the practical relevance of these two concepts. We show that if a choice
model is derived from a random utility model, then the alternatives can only exhibit substitutability.
However, using our welfare-based framework, we can design choice models that have more flexible
substitutability or complementarity patterns. We also show how this property can be reflected
through the regularization function in a representative agent model. Before we formally define
these two concepts, we first introduce the definition of local monotonicity:
Definition 7 (local monotonicity). A function f(x) :R 7→ R is locally increasing at x if
there exists δ > 0 such that
f(x−h)≤ f(x)≤ f(x+h), ∀ 0<h< δ.
Similarly, f(x) is locally decreasing at x if there exists δ > 0 such that
f(x−h)≥ f(x)≥ f(x+h), ∀ 0<h< δ.
Now we introduce the definition of substitutability and complementarity in choice models:
Definition 8. Consider a choice model q(µ) :Rn 7→∆n−1. For any fixed µ and i, j ∈N :
1. (Substitutability) If qj(µ) is locally decreasing in µi at µ, then we say alternative i is substi-
tutable to alternative j at µ. Furthermore, if qj(µ) is locally decreasing in µi for all µ, then we
say alternative i is substitutable to alternative j;
2. (Complementarity) If qj(µ) is locally increasing in µi at µ, then we say alternative i is comple-
mentary to alternative j at µ. Furthermore, if qj(µ) is locally increasing in µi for all µ, then
we say alternative i is complementary to alternative j.
3. (Substitutable Choice Model) For all i 6= j, if alternative i is substitutable to alternative j, then
we say q(µ) is a substitutable choice model.
The definition of substitutability and complementarity of two alternatives is similar to that of
two consumer goods (see Mankiw 1997). However, in Definition 8, the independent variable is not
the price, and the dependent variable is choice probability rather than demand. We first investigate
some basic properties of substitutability and complementarity.
Proposition 7. Consider a choice model q(µ) :Rn 7→∆n−1 that is derived from a differentiable
choice welfare function w(µ). For any i, alternative i must be complementary to itself. Furthermore,
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if w(µ) is second-order continuously differentiable and alternative i is substitutable (complemen-
tary, resp.) to alternative j at µ, then alternative j must be substitutable (complementary, resp.)
to alternative i at µ.
The proof of Proposition 7 uses some basic properties of continuous and convex function and is
delegated to the Appendix. The proposition shows that when w(µ) is second-order continuously dif-
ferentiable, the substitutability (complementarity, resp.) property is a reciprocal property. In these
cases, we shall say i and j are substitutable (complementary, resp.) in the following discussions.
In the following, we investigate the substitutability and complementarity of choice models. First
we show that random utility models are all substitutable:
Theorem 5. Any random utility model q(µ) is a substitutable choice model.
Theorem 5 directly follows from Proposition 6. It states that in a random utility model, if the
utility of one alternative increases while the utilities of all other alternatives stay the same, then it
must be that the choice probabilities of all other alternatives decrease. This is certainly plausible
in practice, especially if µ is intepreted as how much a consumer values each product. However, as
we show in the following example, sometimes it might be desirable to allow different alternatives
to exhibit certain degrees of complementarity. This is especially true if we allow more versatile
meanings of the utility µ.
Example 1. Suppose a customer is considering to buy a camera from the following three alter-
natives: a Canon-A model, a Canon-B model and a Sony-C model. On a certain website, there are
customer reviews that rate each model, which we denote by v1, v2 and v3, respectively. We assume
that the customer’s choice is solely based on those review scores (suppose other factors are fixed).
That is, the choice probability q is a function of v = (v1, v2, v3). Suppose at a certain time, a new
review for the Canon-A model comes in, rating it favorably. How would it change the purchase
probability of the Canon-B model?
The answer to the above questions may depend. There might be two forces. On one hand, due to
a new favorable rating given to the Canon brand, the probability of choosing the Canon-B model
might increase. On the other hand, the favorable rating for the Canon-A model might switch some
customers from the Canon-B model to the Canon-A model. Either force might be dominant in
practice. If the former force is stronger, then it is plausible that one additional favorable rating for
the Canon-A model might increase the choice probability of the Canon-B model. 
The above example illustrates that sometimes it might be desirable to have a choice model
in which a certain pair of alternatives exhibit complementarity. One may notice that the above
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example may be reminiscent of the nested logit model, in which the customers first choose a nest (in
this case, the brand), and then choose a particular product. When increasing the utility of another
product in the same nest, the tradeoff is between the probability of choosing the nest (which will
be higher) and the individual product (which will be lower). However, we note that the nested logit
model is essentially a random utility model (with the randomness ǫ chosen to be an extreme value
distribution). Therefore, it is impossible to capture complementarity between alternatives through
a nested logit model. Next, we show that we can capture the substitutability/complementarity of
alternatives through our welfare-based framework.
In the following discussion, we only consider choice models q(µ) that are derived from differen-
tiable choice welfare functions w(µ). We study necessary and sufficient conditions on the model
parameters for a choice model to be substitutable. We first review the concepts of supermodularity
and submodularity:
Definition 9 (Supermodularity and Submodularity). A function f :Rn 7→ R ∪ {∞} is
called supermodular if for any x,y ∈ Rn, f(x ∨ y) + f(x ∧ y) ≥ f(x) + f(y), where x ∨ y and
x ∧ y denote the componentwise maximum and minimum of x and y, respectively. A function
f :Rn 7→R∪{−∞} is called submodular if −f is supermodular.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Consider a choice model q(µ) :Rn 7→ ∆n−1 that is derived from a differentiable
choice welfare function w(µ). Then
1. q(µ) is a substitutable choice model if and only if w(µ) is submodular.
2. If q(µ) is a substitutable choice model, then there exists an essentially strictly convex V (·) with
V¯i(·) supermodular on R
n−1 for all i, such that
q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣∣x∈∆n−1} ,
where
V¯i(z) =
{
V
(
z1, z2, ..., zi−1,1−
∑n−1
j=1 zj, zi, ..., zn−1
)
, if eTz ≤ 1 and z ≥ 0,
+∞, otherwise.
(16)
Furthermore, the reverse is true if n= 3.
We present the proof of Theorem 6 in the Appendix. Theorem 6 provides some sufficient and
necessary conditions for q(µ) to be substitutable. We note that the supermodularity of V¯i has
nothing to do with the supermodularity of V . In fact, since V (x) is only meaningful on ∆n−1, it can
always be modified to be supermodular by defining V (x) =+∞ for all x /∈∆n−1. The definition of
V¯i(·) reduces a redundant variable in V , making the operations “x∨y” and “x∧y” meaningful.
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Next we provide an easy-to-check sufficient condition for a substitutable choice model. We note
that in the MDM and the MMM introduced in Propositions 3 and 4, the corresponding V (·)s are
separable. The following theorem shows that the choice models derived from such V (·)s are always
substitutable:
Theorem 7. If V (x) =
∑
i∈N Vi(xi) on ∆n−1 where Vi(xi) : [0,1] 7→R
n is a strictly convex func-
tion for all i∈N . Then q(µ) defined by
q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} , (17)
is a substitutable choice model.
Another possible choice of V (·) is a quadratic function. In that case, we have the following
results:
Theorem 8. Consider q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} , where V (x) = xTAx is
strictly convex with A≻ 0. Then V¯i(z) for all i ∈ N are supermodular if and only if Ajk −Aik −
Aij +Aii ≥ 0 for all distinct i, j, k ∈N , where Aij is the (i, j)-th entry of A.
Combining Theorems 6 and 8, we know that when n = 3 and V (x) = xTAx with A ≻ 0, the
choice model defined by q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} is substitutable if and only if
A12+A33 ≥A13+A23, A13+A22 ≥A12+A23 and A23+A11 ≥A12+A13.
Note that the above condition is different from A being positive semidefinite. Indeed, the following
example shows a case where the choice model is not substitutable even if V (x) is strictly convex
and supermodular:
Example 2. Consider q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} , where V (x) =xTAx with
A=

 3 2 02 3 2
0 2 3

≻ 0.
It is easy to see that V (x) is strictly convex and supermodular. However, it doesn’t satisfy that
A13+A22 ≥A12+A23. By some further calculations, we obtain that
V¯2(z) = z
T
(
2 −1
−1 2
)
z− [−2;−2]Tz+3,
which is not supermodular.
Therefore q(µ) is not a substitutable choice model by Theorem 6. In fact, when we fix µ2 = µ3 =0
and plot the choice probabilities against µ1 in the range of values [−2,2] as shown in Figure 1, it
is observed that q3 increases in µ1 in the range of [−1.5,−1], i.e., alternative 3 is complementary
to alternative 1 in that interval. 
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Figure 1 Choice Probabilities in Example 2 with µ2 = µ3 =0
In addition to the quadratic example above, we can also easily generate a non-substitutable
choice model through a proper choice welfare function w(·):
Example 3. Consider the following function:
w(µ) = log
(
eµ1 + eµ2 + eµ3 + e0.5(µ1+µ2)
)
.
It is easy to see that w(µ) is monotone, translation invariant and convex, therefore it is a choice
welfare function. Also, it is differentiable. The corresponding choice probability is:
q(µ) =
1
eµ1 + eµ2 + eµ3 + e0.5(µ1+µ2)
(
eµ1 +
1
2
e0.5(µ1+µ2), eµ2 +
1
2
e0.5(µ1+µ2), eµ3
)
.
Furthermore, the second-order derivative of w(µ) with respect to µ1 and µ2 is
∂2w(µ)
∂µ1∂µ2
=
∂q1(µ)
∂µ2
=
∂q2(µ)
∂µ1
=
e0.5(µ1+µ2)(−eµ1 − eµ2 + eµ3 − 4e0.5(µ1+µ2))
4(eµ1 + eµ2 + eµ3 + e0.5(µ1+µ2))2
.
It is positive if and only if eµ3 ≥ 4e0.5µ1+0.5µ2 + eµ1 + eµ2. Therefore, under this choice model, when
µ3 is large enough (compared to µ1 and µ2), then alternatives 1 and 2 will exhibit complementarity.
On the other hand, if µ1 or µ2 (or both) are comparable to µ3, then they will exhibit substitutability.
Now we give a plausible explanation for this model. Suppose as in Example 1, we explain µ as
the number of positive reviews for each product. Then the above substitutability pattern could
be reasonable if alternatives 1 and 2 are both from some relatively unknown brand (which has
very few positive reviews in the history), while alternative 3 is from a well-known brand (which in
contrast, has a lot of positive reviews). Then a few more positive reviews on either alternative 1 or
2 will be likely to positively impact the purchase probability of the other one, since it increases the
overall attractiveness of this brand. On the other hand, if alternatives 1 and 2 have already gained
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enough positive reviews in the past, then further increasing the number of positive reviews of one
of them will be more likely to attract the demand from the other one, rather than from alternative
3.
To numerically illustrate the above model, we fix µ2 = 0, µ3 = 3 and plot the choice probability
of alternative 2 as a function of µ1 in the range of [−10,5] in Figure 2. From Figure 2, we can see
that alternative 2 is complementary to alternative 1 when µ1 ∈ [−10,2].
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Figure 2 q2 as a Function of µ1 in Example 3
The above two examples show that by using the welfare-based framework, it is possible to con-
struct choice models with more versatile substitution patterns. In addition, the above two examples
further verify that even when n= 3, we can construct choice models that do not have a random util-
ity representation (remember all random utility models are substitutable choice models). Therefore,
the welfare-based choice model (thus also the representative agent model and the semi-parametric
models) strictly subsumes the random utility model, even for n= 3. This result is an extension of
the result obtained by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), which only showed the result for n≥ 4.
6. Constructing New Choice Models from Existing Ones
In this section, we show that by using the welfare-based choice model framework, one can easily
construct new choice models from existing ones. In particular, we provide three transformations
below by which new choice models can be derived from existing ones. In the following discussions,
we use q¯(·) to denote existing welfare-based choice models with choice welfare function w¯(·), and
use q(·) and w(·) to denote the choice probability and the choice welfare function of the new model,
respectively.
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1. Scaling. Given any existing choice welfare function w¯(·) and any η > 0, one can easily verify
that w(µ) = ηw¯ (µ/η) is still a choice welfare function. The corresponding choice model is
q(µ) = q¯ (µ/η). We note that if q¯(·) has an RUM representation, then q(·) also has an RUM
representation with ǫ= ηǫ¯. As η becomes larger, the difference among µ/η is smaller and the
choice will be more evenly distributed. As pointed out in Gigerenzer and Selten (2002), such η
can be used to model the level of rationality of the individual.
2. Mixing. Let Bk, k= 1, ...,m be a cover of N , i.e., ∪kBk =N . Let w¯k(µk) be the choice welfare
function on alternatives in Bk, with choice probabilities q¯
k(µk). Define
w(µ) =
m∑
k=1
λkw¯k(µk),
where λk ≥ 0,
∑m
k=1 λk = 1. We can verify that w(µ) is a choice welfare function and its corre-
sponding choice model is
qi(µ) =
∑
k:i∈Bk
λk q¯
k
i (µk), ∀i∈N .
If q¯k(·) has an RUM representation for all k, then q(·) also has an RUM representation by
assuming ǫ has a mixed distribution of ǫk, each with probability λk. This model can be used to
model choice scenarios where there are different segments of customers. Customers of different
segments may only care about a subset of the products and choose according to a certain choice
model. Then the mixed model is the choice model for the entire population.
3. Crossing. Let A be an m× n matrix with Aij ≥ 0 and Ae
n = em, where eℓ refers to an ℓ-
dimensional column vector of ones. Given an existing choice welfare function w¯(·) and its choice
probabilities q¯(·), we can easily verify that
w(µ) = w¯(Aµ)
is still a choice welfare function and the corresponding welfare-based choice model is
q(µ) =∇µw(µ) =A
T∇w¯(Aµ) =AT q¯(Aµ).
An example of such a transformation was in fact shown in Example 3, where w¯(µ) is an MNL
model for 4 alternatives with η= 1 and
A=


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0.5 0.5 0

 .
In light of this example, we note that RUM is not closed under cross-transformation, i.e., even
if q¯(·) has an RUM representation, q(µ) may not. Thus, the cross-transformation provides us
a way of generating new choice models.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new framework for discrete choice models: the welfare-based choice
model, which is based on the idea of considering the expected utility an individual can get when
facing a set of alternatives. We showed that the welfare-based choice model is equivalent to the rep-
resentative agent model and the semi-parametric model, thus establishing the equivalence between
the latter two. We also showed that the welfare-based choice model subsumes the random utility
model by relaxing its requirement on properties of higher-order cross-partial derivatives of the
choice welfare function. In particular, we showed that when there are only two alternatives, the
welfare-based choice model is equivalent to the random utility model. We defined a new concept for
choice models – substitutability and complementarity – and showed that under the new framework,
we can construct choice models with complementary alternatives, thus enabling us to capture new
choice patterns. We believe that this framework is useful for future studies of choice models.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: The equivalence between 1 and 3 directly follows from Theorem 1. Next
we show that 1⇒ 2. If w(µ) is a differentiable choice welfare function, by Theorem 1, we know
that
w(µ) =max
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} ,
where V (x) = supy {y
Tx−w(y)}. Therefore, V (x) is the convex conjugate of w(µ). By Theorem
6.3 in Rockafellar (1974), we know that w(µ) is essentially differentiable if and only if V (x) is
essentially strictly convex. Also, from the envelope theorem (see Mas-Colell et al. 1995),
∇w(µ) =∇µ
(
µTx−V (x)
) ∣∣
x=x∗
=x∗,
where x∗ = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1}. Therefore,
q(µ) =∇w(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1} .
Last, we show that 2⇒ 1. Given an essentially strictly convex V (x), by Theorem 1, we know
that
w(µ) =max
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1}
is a choice welfare function. Again, by Theorem 6.3 in Rockafellar (1974), we know that w(µ) is
essentially differentiable. Moreover, in our case, w(µ) is a convex and finitely valued function in Rn,
thus essentially differentiability is equivalent to differentiability. Again, by applying the envelope
theorem, q(µ) =∇w(µ). Therefore the theorem is proved. 
Proof of Theorem 3: First we show the equivalence between 1 and 2. Based on Theorem 2,
it suffices to prove that w(µ) is superlinear if and only if V (x) defined by maxy{y
Tx−w(y)} is
upper bounded. If w(µ) is superlinear, we have, for any x∈∆n−1,
w(µ)≥
∑
i∈N
xi(µi+ bi) =x
Tµ+xTb≥xTµ+min
i
{bi}.
By reorganizing terms, we have
xTµ−w(µ)≤−min
i
{bi}=max
i
{−bi}.
Therefore, V (x) =maxy {y
Tx−w(y)} ≤maxi {−bi}, i.e., V (x) is upper bounded.
To show the other direction, if V (x) is upper bounded by a constant u, then we have
w(µ)≥max
{
µTx−u
∣∣x∈∆n−1}≥ µi−u, ∀i,
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i.e., w(µ) is superlinear. Therefore, the equivalence between 1 and 2 is proved.
Next we show the equivalence between 1 and 3. We first show that for any superlinear differen-
tiable choice welfare function w(µ), we can find a distribution set Θ consisting of only distributions
with finite expectation such that w(µ) can be represented as w(µ) = supθ∈Θ Eθ [maxi∈N µi+ ǫi] .
First, since w(µ) is convex with q(µ) =∇w(µ), we have
w(µ) = sup
z
{µTq(z)+ l(z)}, (18)
where l(z) =w(z)−zTq(z). Now we define a distribution set Θ that is slightly different from that of
Theorem 1. Specifically, let Θ= {θz
∣∣z ∈Rn}, where θz is an n-point distribution with Pθz (ǫ= ǫiz) =
qi(z), ∀i ∈ N . (Note that by the monotonicity and the translation invariance properties, q(z) =
∇w(z) must satisfy q(z)≥ 0 and eTq(z) = 1.) Here,
ǫiz(j) =
{
l(z) if j = i
l(z)−M(z) if j 6= i.
where
M(z) =max
{
1+max
i,j
{zi− zj},
l(z)−mini {bi}
t∗(z)
}
, (19)
with
t∗(z) =min{qi(z)|qi(z)> 0}. (20)
Since M(z)> zi− zj , for all i, j, we have i= argmaxj {zj + ǫ
i
z
(j)}. Therefore,
Eθz [max
j
zj + ǫj] =
n∑
i=1
qi(z)(zi+ l(z)) = z
Tq(z)+ l(z) =w(z).
Next we show that:
Eθz [max
i
µi+ ǫi]≤w(µ), ∀µ.
For any given µ, define k(i), argmaxj{µj+ǫ
i
z
(j)} (we break ties arbitrarily). There are two cases:
1. For all i such that qi(z)> 0, k(i) = i. In this case, we have
Eθz [max
j
{µj + ǫj}] =
∑
i∈N
qi(z)(µi+ l(z)) =µ
Tq(z)+ l(z)≤w(µ),
in which the last inequality is because of the convexity of w(·).
2. There exists some i such that qi(z)> 0, but k(i) 6= i. In this case, from the construction of θz,
we have
Eθz [max
j
µj + ǫj] =
∑
i∈N ,qi(z)>0
qi(z)(µk(i)+ l(z)−M(z)I{k(i) 6=i})
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≤ max
i
{µi}+ l(z)− t
∗(z)M(z)
≤ max
i
{µi}+min
j
{bj}
≤ max
i
{µi+ bi}
≤ w(µ),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that M(z)> 0 and
∑
i∈N qi(z)I{qi(z)>0,k(i) 6=i} ≥
t∗(z), the second inequality is because of the definition of M(z) and the last inequality follows
from the definition of superlinear function.
Based on the analysis of these two cases, we have
Eǫ∼θz [max
i
µi+ ǫi]≤w(µ), ∀µ.
Then by equation (18) we have
w(µ) = sup
z
{µTq(z)+ l(z)}= sup
z
Eθz [max
i
µi+ ǫi] = sup
θ∈Θ
Eθ[max
i
µi+ ǫi].
Therefore, we have proved that statement 1 implies statement 3.
Finally, we prove that statement 3 implies statement 1. Suppose there exists a distribution θˆ ∈Θ
such that Eθˆ|ǫi|<+∞ for ∀i∈N , then for µ∈R
n we have
sup
θ∈Θ
Eθ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]
≥ Eθˆ
[
max
i∈N
µi+ ǫi
]
=Eθˆ [µj + ǫj] = µj +Eθˆ[ǫj], ∀j.
Therefore we can conclude that w(µ) = supθ∈Θ Eθ [maxi∈N µi+ ǫi] is superlinear.
It remains to prove the last statement. We show that for any
x∈∆◦n−1 , {x
∣∣eTx=1, xi > 0,∀i∈N },
there exists µx such that q(µx) =∇w(µx) =x. Fix x∈∆
◦
n−1, we consider
V (x) =max
µ
{µTx−w(µ)}. (21)
Clearly, V (x) ≥ −w(0), since µ = 0 is a feasible solution. Moreover, since w(µ) is translation
invariant, we can restrict the feasible region of (21) to L , {µ|eTµ = 0}. For all µ ∈ L, we have
µj ≤ 0 for some j ∈N . Thus
µTx≤
∑
i6=j
µixi ≤
∑
i6=j
ximax
k
{µk} ≤ (1−min
i
{xi})max
k
{µk}.
However, by superlinearity of w(µ), we have:
w(µ)≥max
k
{µk + bk} ≥max
k
{µk}+min
k
{bk}.
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Thus, for all µ ∈L, we have:
µTx−w(µ)≤−min
i
{xi}max
k
{µk}−min
k
{bk}.
Let K = w(0)−mink{bk}
mini{xi}
. In order for µ to be optimal to (21), by the above arguments, we would have
µi ≤K for all i. Thus we can further restrict the feasible set of (21) to {µ|e
Tµ= 0, µi ≤K ∀i∈N},
which is a compact set. Since w(µ) is continuous, there exists µx ∈ {µ|e
Tµ= 0, µi ≤K ∀i ∈ N}
that attains maximum in problem (21). By the first-order necessary condition, ∇w(µx) =x. This
concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Since w(µ) is convex and differentiable, for any µ ∈Rn and any t > 0,
we have
w(µ+ tei)−w(µ)≥ te
T
i
∇w(µ) = tqi(µ),
w(µ)−w(µ+ tei)≥−te
T
i
∇w(µ+ tei) =−tqi(µ+ tei).
From these two inequalities, we have qi(µ+ tei)− qi(µ)≥ 0, for all t > 0 and µ. Thus, alternative
i is complementary to itself.
Furthermore, if w(µ) is second-order continuously differentiable, then we have ∂qi
∂µj
= ∂
2w
∂µi∂µj
=
∂2w
∂µj∂µi
=
∂qj
∂µi
. Thus, if alternative i is substitutable (complementary, resp.) to alternative j at µ,
then alternative j is substitutable (complementary, resp.) to alternative i at µ. 
Proof of Theorem 6: In this proof, we use the following lemma from Murota (2003).
Lemma 1. Let f :Rn 7→ R∪ {∞} be a function such that there exists at least one µ such that
f(µ)<∞. Let g(x) =maxµ {µ
Tx− f(µ)} be the convex conjugate of f . We have
1. If f is submodular, then g is supermodular.
2. If n= 2 and f is supermodular, then g is submodular.
Now we use this lemma to prove the theorem. To prove the first part, by Simchi-Levi et al.
(2014), a differentiable function w(µ) is submodular in µ if and only if ∂w(µ)
∂µi
is decreasing in µj
for all i 6= j. By the definition of q(µ) =∇w(µ), the result holds.
For the second part, let V (x) = maxµ {µ
Tx−w(µ)} be the convex conjugate of w(µ). From
Theorem 2, V (x) is essentially strictly convex and
q(µ) = argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣∣x∈∆n−1} .
For any y ∈ Rn−1 and i ∈ N , define fi(y) = w(y1, y2, ..., yi−1,0, yi, ..., yn−1). Also define µ−i =
(µ1, ..., µi−1, µi+1, ..., µn), then we have
V¯i(z) = max
µ
{µT−iz+µi(1− e
Tz)−w(µ)}
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= max
µ,µi=0
{µT−iz+µi(1− e
Tz)−w(µ)}
= max
y
{yTz− fi(y)},
where the second equality is due to the translation invariance property of w(µ). The submodularity
of w(µ) implies the submodularity of fi(y) for all i ∈N . Thus V¯i(z), as the convex conjugate of
fi(y), is supermodular by Lemma 1.
For the last statement, since V (·) is an essentially strictly convex function, q(µ) =
argmax
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣∣x∈∆n−1} is well-defined. By Theorem 2, q(µ) = ∇w(µ) where
w(µ) = sup
{
µTx−V (x)
∣∣x∈∆n−1}. For any y ∈ Rn−1 and i ∈ N , define fi(y) =
w(y1, y2, ..., yi−1,0, yi, ..., yn−1). Also define x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xn), then we have
fi(y) = max
x∈∆n−1
{
xT−iy+0(1− e
Tx−i)−V (x)
}
= max
x∈∆n−1
{
xT−iy− V¯i(x−i)
}
= max
x
{
yTx−i− V¯i(x−i)
}
= max
z
{
yTz− V¯i(z)
}
,
where the third equality holds since V¯i(x−i) = +∞ for all x /∈∆n−1. From Lemma 1, given that
n = 3 and thus y ∈ R2, fi(y) is submodular. It remains to show that w(µ) is also submodular.
According to Theorem 6, it suffices to show that qi(µ) is locally decreasing with µj for all j 6= i for all
µ. Fix i, j and let k 6= i, j. We assume i > j without loss of generality. We have qi(µ−µke) = qi(µ)
from translation invariance property. But qi(µ−µke) =
∂fk(µi−µk ,µj−µk)
∂µi
is non-decreasing with µj
due to the submodularity of fk. Thus w(µ) is submodular and q(µ) =∇w(µ) is a substitutable
choice model. 
Proof of Theorem 7: We first consider the case where Vi(xi) is differentiable for all i ∈N . Let
λ(µ) be the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint
∑
i xi = 1. The KKT conditions (see Bertsekas
2003) for problem (17) can be written as:
µi−V
′
i (qi(µ))−λ(µ)≤ 0, ∀i∈N ;
µi−V
′
i (qi(µ))−λ(µ) = 0, ∀i s.t. qi(µ) 6= 0;
qi(µ)≥ 0, ∀i∈N ;∑
i∈N qi(µ) = 1.
Now we consider any two points µ0 and µ0+ tei where ei is a unit vector along the i-th coordinate
axis and t > 0. Suppose that there exists a j 6= i such that qj(µ0+ tei)> qj(µ0). Since Vj is strictly
convex, V ′j (qj(µ0+ tei))>V
′
j (qj(µ0)). There are two possible cases for qj(µ0):
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• qj(µ0)> 0: In this case, we have µj −V
′
j (qj(µ0+ tei))−λ(µ0+ tei) = 0 and µj −V
′
j (qj(µ0))−
λ(µ0) = 0, therefore, we have λ(µ0+ tei)<λ(µ0).
• qj(µ0) = 0: In this case, µj−V
′
j (qj(µ0))−λ(µ0)≤ 0, which implies that µj−V
′
j (qj(µ0+ tei))−
λ(µ0)< 0. But µj −V
′
j (qj(µ0+ tei))−λ(µ0+ tei) = 0, we have λ(µ0+ tei)<λ(µ0).
In both cases, λ(µ0 + tei) < λ(µ0). This implies that qj(µ0 + tei) ≥ qj(µ0) for all j 6= i. Note
that we also have qi(µ0+ tei)> qi(µ0) by Proposition 7. Therefore, we have
∑
j∈N qj(µ0+ tei)>∑
j∈N qj(µ0) = 1, which contradicts with that q(µ0 + tei) ∈∆n−1. Thus we have qj(µ0 + tei) ≤
qj(µ0) for all j 6= i. Since this is true for all µ0 and t > 0, q is substitutable.
If Vi(xi) is not differentiable, we need to replace the derivative with the subgradient in the above
argument. Since Vi is strictly convex, g1 > g2 for all g1 ∈ ∂Vi(x1) and g2 ∈ ∂Vi(x2) if x1 > x2, the
above argument is still valid. 
Proof of Theorem 8: For i ∈ N , V¯i is an n − 1 variate quadratic function. Let H
i denote
the Hessian matrix of V¯i(z). For j, k ∈ {1,2, ..., n− 1} and j 6= k, the off-diagonal element H
i
j,k =
Aj˜,k˜−Ai,k˜ −Ai,j˜ +Ai,i, where
j˜ =
{
j, if j < i,
j+1, if j ≥ i;
and k˜=
{
k, if k < i,
k+1, if k≥ i.
Thus, V¯i(z) is supermodular if and only if H
i
j,k ≥ 0 for all j, k ∈ {1,2, ..., n− 1} and j 6= k, which is
equivalent to Aj,k −Ai,k−Ai,j +Ai,i ≥ 0 for all distinct i, j, k ∈N . 
